When are Women More Generous than Men? by Cox, James & Deck, Cary
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
1-1-2006 
When are Women More Generous than Men? 
James Cox 
Georgia State University 
Cary Deck 
University of Arkansas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, James and Deck, Cary, "When are Women More Generous than Men?" (2006). ExCEN Working 
Papers. 130. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/130 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
4.4.06…FORTHCOMING IN ECONOMIC INQUIRY  
 
 
When are Women More Generous than Men? 
 
 
James C. Cox  
and  
Cary A. Deck* 
 
RRH:  Cox & Deck:  Gender and Generosity 
 
 
 
 1
  JEL C70, C91, D63, D64 
 
When are Women More Generous than Men? 
 
Previous research on gender differences in behavior has led to seemingly contradictory findings 
about generosity.  From data generated by 290 subject pairs, we find that women are more 
sensitive than men to the costs of generous actions when deciding whether or not to be generous. 
The factors that affect the level of generosity observed in our experiments are reciprocal 
motivation, the level of money payoffs, and the level of social distance in the experimental 
protocol.  The relatively greater sensitivity of women to the costs of generous behavior can 
explain most of the apparent inconsistencies in previously-reported findings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Gender’s impact on behavior and decision-making continues to be a topic of much debate 
and scrutiny.  As evidence one need look no further than the firestorm stemming from comments 
by Lawrence Summers, the President of Harvard University, about the potential role that gender 
differences play in academia.1 There is considerable experimental evidence that behavior varies 
with gender.  For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) find that by the time they are nine 
years old, boys are already more competitive than girls.  Harbaugh, Niederle, and Vesterlund 
(2005) find that by fourth grade boys are more confident about their own abilities. Neiderle and 
Vesterlund (2005) report a similar difference for college students.2  The real impacts of gender 
differences are wide-ranging.  Rask and Tiefenthaler (2004) examine the gender gap in 
undergraduate economics majors.  They find that female students are more responsive to their 
grades in principles classes when deciding whether to enroll in advanced economics courses than 
are their male counterparts, which could explain why average GPAs are typically higher for 
female economics majors.  Understanding gender differences not only affects how one 
approaches social issues such as why relatively fewer women pursue careers in the hard sciences 
(President Summers’ controversial question), but it can have strategic effects as well.  Should a 
firm send a male or a female representative to handle a bargaining negotiation with a supplier?  
What about negotiating a dispute within the firm?  Based upon a field experiment, Landry, 
Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2005) find that contributions to a public good are higher when the 
solicitor is an attractive female.  This could suggest that women should lead high profile charity 
fundraising. In a National Public Radio interview, Helen Fischer argued that more and more 
businesses are trying to understand the “natural talents” of women and maintained that those 
businesses that do know how to use this “resource” are “winning.”3  
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Several laboratory studies have found significant gender differences even in simple 
games, however apparently contradictory evidence exists as to the magnitude and direction of 
these gender differences.4  This paper compares behavior across genders for two basic allocation 
decisions that have been widely studied in the laboratory, a dictator game and a trust game.5  In a 
dictator game the allocation decision stands alone, while the allocation decision is preceded by 
another person’s action in the trust game.  In the trust game a player could be faced with the 
same allocation decision as a dictator but only as the result of another person’s decision.  
Observed behavioral differences between these two decision contexts can be used to identify 
reciprocal behavior (see Cox 2004 and Cox and Deck 2005).  The difference between being a 
dictator and responding to the action of another may alter behavior as the opportunity to act 
reciprocally could increase the subjective payoff of a jointly beneficial money payoff outcome.   
Other factors that have been found to influence behavior include social distance and the 
payoff level.  Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) and Cox and Deck (2005) show that 
varying the social distance involved in the experimental protocol can cause economic agents to 
choose differently over the same set of monetary outcomes.  A low social distance, in which 
agents’ identities are more closely associated with their actions, increases the social cost of 
selfish behavior.  Behavioral effects from situational features such as the ability to reciprocate 
and the social distance are consistent with an economic model that views decisions as not being 
based solely on monetary outcomes.  Of course, the monetary stakes involved in the allocation 
decision are also a cost of being generous.   
 Previous research examined the effects of gender in allocation games but led to mixed 
findings.  In ultimatum games, Eckel and Grossman (2001) and Solnick (2001) find that males 
and females make identical offers but Eckel and Grossman find that women are more willing to 
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accept unfair offers while Solnick finds no second mover gender difference.  In dictator games 
Bolton and Katoc (1995) find no gender differences while Eckel and Grossman (1998) report 
that women are more generous than men in a high social distance environment.  Also, under a 
high social distance protocol, Cox (2002) reports that men act reciprocally while women do not 
in the investment game.  However, Croson and Buchan (1999) and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 
(2003) find that women are more likely to behave generously in an investment game.  In another 
study, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) demonstrate that the relative price of generosity interacts 
with gender.  In their study of dictator games, male proposers are more sensitive to the price of 
allocating money to their counterparts than are women.   
This study seeks to identify gender differences in behavior in trust and dictator games by 
systematically comparing actions taken in allocation decisions across several contexts with 
varied costs of generosity.  The next section describes the experiments used to compare the 
behavior of men and women.  The results of the experiments are then presented followed by a 
further investigation of the treatment effects.  A separate section contains a discussion of the 
implications of the results, including a reconciliation of previously reported disparate findings. 
We find that women are more responsive to the total economic and social costs of 
generosity than are men, and thus behavioral gender differences are dependent on the decision 
context.  Thus there is no simple answer to the question: “Are women more generous than men?”  
The answer is neither “yes” nor “no”; it is, instead, much more subtle and interesting than that. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 Groups of between 12 and 20 subjects were recruited for a one hour experiment.  Each 
subject was paid a $5 show-up fee and seated at a computer terminal with privacy screens on 
three sides. The subjects read computerized directions describing how decisions would be made 
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in the extensive form game and how the dollar payoffs would be determined.6 After completing 
the directions, the subjects answered a quiz that was checked by an experimenter.7  A subject 
was randomly assigned one role and played one game, one time.   
We here eschew the task of providing a general definition of generous behavior that 
could be applied in all contexts in favor of providing an un-nuanced definition that can easily be 
applied to interpret data from the experiments we discuss. Within this context, the “generosity” 
or “generous behavior” of some subjects can be clearly identified as follows. Consider those 
decision tasks where the decision-maker makes either the only choice or the last choice that 
determines the division of a given amount of money between himself and another subject in the 
experiment. A subject making such a decision is “generous” if she rejects the alternative that 
maximizes her money payoff (and thereby minimizes the other’s payoff) in favor of an 
alternative feasible choice that gives the other subject more than the minimum possible amount 
of money. In our binary choice experiment, a subject either does or does not make the generous 
choice. Other experiments that we discuss give the subjects more than two alternatives. For such 
experiments, if subject A gives to subject B more of a given total amount of money than subject 
C gives to subject D then we say that subject A is more generous than subject C (in that 
experiment). When providing an answer to a question about whether women or men are more 
generous in our binary-choice context, we will compare the percentages of generous choices 
made by subjects of the two sexes.  Conclusions about the relative generosity of males and 
females in multiple-choice contexts require use of measures such as mean amounts of money 
given to paired subjects. 
Economic and Social Costs and Benefits of Generous Behavior 
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In many experiments involving generosity there are various types of costs of generous or 
ungenerous behavior. Generous behavior has a monetary cost. For example, in a dictator game 
the amount of money that the dictator allocates to the paired subject is the monetary cost of 
generosity.  In our binary dictator games the monetary cost of the generous action, giving the 
other subject 37.5% of the total payoff, is varied by changing the dollar amount of the total 
payoff.  A similar monetary cost treatment is also introduced in the trust game.  
 Monetary costs are not the only possible source of utility or disutility from choosing 
among more and less generous alternatives; if they were then all subjects would behave as the 
self-regarding or “economic man” model predicts by choosing the least generous alternative 
available. Generous behavior can increase utility if the decision-maker has altruistic preferences. 
Ungenerous behavior can decrease utility if the decision-maker experiences guilt or shame.  For 
example, a person responding to a kind action of another person may feel guilt from acting 
ungenerously when he or she had the opportunity to repay the kind action with a generous 
response. We vary some possible effects of altruism and anticipated guilt on behavior in the 
experiment by including or excluding the possibility that the decision-maker is responding to a 
kind action by another person. Another possible source of disutility from ungenerous behavior is 
shame that may be experienced if others can observe one’s behavior. We vary some possible 
effects of anticipated shame on behavior by changing the level of social distance between the 
decision-makers and others, including the experimenters as observers.   
Game Structure:  Dictator and Trust Games   
 In some settings a person may wish to be generous because of reciprocal motives.  
Specifically, a previous action by another party that is kind or helpful may trigger a social norm 
making the decision-maker feel obliged to respond in a generous manner.  If such a norm is 
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activated in the experimental environment, then ungenerous behavior becomes more costly and 
hence should be observed less frequently.  Generous behavior could still be observed in the 
absence of such reciprocal motivations if the decision-maker has altruistic other-regarding 
preferences.  To explore the increased level of generosity from reciprocity, two different 
extensive form games are included in this study.  The games are shown in Figure 1.  The number 
at a node indicates which player (or “mover”) makes a decision at that point in the game.  The 
top number at an outcome is mover 1’s dollar payoff and the bottom number is mover 2’s dollar 
payoff.  In the dictator games shown in the top part of Figure 1, mover 1 chooses between 
keeping all the money and keeping only 62.5% of the money while allocating the remaining 
37.5% to the other player.8  In the dictator game, generous behavior cannot be attributed to 
reciprocal motives because the other player has not taken (and cannot take) an action that 
benefits the decision-maker.  In the trust game, shown in the bottom part of Figure 1, a decision-
maker at node  faces the same allocation decisions as in the dictator game at node  if and 
only if the other player has not previously opted for an equal split of a smaller pie.9  Because the 
only difference between the trust and dictator games for subjects choosing between the generous 
action ((7.5, 12.5) or (15, 25) depending on payoff level) and the ungenerous action ((0, 20) or 
(0, 40) depending on payoff level) is the presence or absence of the prior move by the paired 
subject, the difference between response rates in the two games provides a test for the 
significance of positive reciprocity as a motive for behavior in the trust game (Cox and Deck 
2005). 
Payoff Level:  Low or High 
 The monetary component of the cost of generosity is the amount of money that an agent 
has to forego by choosing a generous action.  As shown in Figure 1, the high payoff level has a 
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direct cost of $15.00 for generosity while the cost in the low payoff level is $7.50.  Because a 
higher payoff level generates a greater cost, one should expect (weakly) less generous behavior 
in such an environment.   
Social Distance:  Low or  High 
 In our terminology, social distance refers to the degree of social separation between the 
decision-maker and other parties including the other player, the other subjects in the experiment, 
and the experimenters.  Potential costs of not being generous include the decision-maker’s belief 
about the perception that others have of him or her, how the decision-maker’s interactions with 
people who have observed the decision are affected, and any emotional response such as shame 
or embarrassment felt by the decision-maker.  The less social distance between the decision-
maker and others, the greater the possible social cost associated with ungenerous behavior. 
In all of our laboratory sessions subjects were anonymously matched with someone else 
in the lab and never learned the identity of their counterparts.  Subjects in treatments with low 
social distance entered their names in their computers prior to making decisions. Hence, these 
subjects knew that their names were associated with their decisions. At the end of the 
experiment, these subjects were individually called by name and privately handed their earnings 
by the experimenter.  In contrast, all personal identification of the decision-makers was 
eliminated in the high social distance treatments.  Under the high social distance protocol, 
subjects drew unmarked sealed envelopes containing keys labeled with alphanumeric 
identification codes. These identification codes were the subjects’ private information. Instead of 
entering their names in the computers, subjects entered these identification codes. At the 
conclusion of a high social distance session, subjects were escorted to a separate room where 
they could use their keys to open locked mailboxes that contained sealed envelopes with their 
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earnings.  The experimenters were not present when the subjects opened their key envelopes, 
entered their identification codes, or retrieved their payoffs.  This process was explained to the 
subjects in a handout that was read aloud to assure all subjects that no one would ever know the 
personal decision of any subject. The low social distance sessions always involved exactly 
twelve subjects.  In contrast, high social distance sessions had between fourteen and twenty 
subjects, and thus a lower probability that any two specific subjects would be anonymously 
paired, thus further increasing the social distance above that in the low social distance protocol.    
Experimental Treatments 
 The experimental design includes five treatments that vary the economic and social costs 
of generosity. To identify a treatment we use R, for reciprocity, or D, for dictator, depending on 
the type of decision the second mover (in the trust game) or only mover (in the dictator game) is 
making. Also, we use a $ superscript for high stakes payoffs or a $ subscript for low stakes 
payoffs, and an S superscript for high social distance procedures or an S subscript for low social 
distance procedures. Table 1 lists all the treatments and the numbers of subject pairs that 
participated in each treatment.10      
Collecting Gender Data 
 In order to determine if gender influences the decision to be generous, one must be able 
to identify the sex of the decision-maker.  In the low social distance protocol, gender data 
collection is trivial because payoffs are made face to face. However, under the high social 
distance protocol the experimenter only knows the alphanumeric code associated with a decision.  
Collection of gender data in this environment required supplementary procedures. After 
collecting their payoffs from mailboxes, subjects exited the mailbox room and deposited their 
keys in one of two appropriately labeled containers positioned on opposite sides of the hallway.  
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One container was labeled “Men’s Keys” and the other was labeled “Women’s Keys.”  The 
experimenters watched from a distance to ensure that subjects dropped their coded keys in the 
appropriate containers.  This viewing distance was sufficiently great so that the experimenters 
could not observe the key codes but could make sure the subjects approached the right 
containers.  Subjects in both social distance environments were not informed prior to making 
their decisions that gender data would be recorded. 
 
III. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
 The data on generosity consist of 128 choices between keeping all the money and 
allocating 37.5% of it to the other player.11  The raw data are reported in Table 2. 
  Data reported by Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) and Cox (2002) suggest that men 
are more generous than women. However, data reported by Nowell and Tinker (1994), Eckel and 
Grossman (1998), Croson and Buchan (1999), and Chaudhuri and Gagadharan (2003) suggest 
the opposite. Based on the data reported in Table 2, there is no clear pattern of relative generosity 
by men and women. To explore these seemingly contradictory patterns, our analysis first focuses 
on the within-gender impact of varying the cost of generosity. Table 3 reports the results of pair-
wise tests of the null hypothesis that 
varying the cost of generosity has no impact on behavior versus the two-sided alternative that the 
costs do affect behavior. The figures above the diagonal are p-values for male test results and the 
figures below the diagonal are female test p-values. 
The first striking feature in Table 3 is that for men the decision about whether to be 
generous does not depend on reciprocal considerations, the level of payoffs, or the social 
distance. As explained in Cox (2004) and Cox and Deck (2005), if reciprocity influences 
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behavior then there should be a significant difference in behavior between a trust game and the 
corresponding dictator game in the high social distance, low money payoff comparison ( RS$  vs. 
DS$ ) or the low social distance, high money payoff comparison ( RS
$  vs. DS
$ ) or both. For men, 
this is clearly not the case as the p-values are 0.457 and 0.999, respectively.  Similarly, based on 
comparison of high payoff, high social distance ( R S$ ) data with 
low payoff, high social distance ( RS$ ) data, changes in the level of monetary payoff do not 
significantly change the behavior of men (p-value = 0.35).  Based on a comparison of high 
payoff, high social distance ( R S$ ) data with high payoff, low social distance ( RS
$ ) data, the level 
of social distance is also found not to influence the behavior of men (p-value = 0.682).  In fact no 
combination of these factors strongly influences male behavior, as evidenced by the absence of 
significant p-values above the diagonal in Table 3.     
 Unlike men, women do base the decision of whether or not to be generous on the costs 
associated with the decision.  Women are more likely to be generous when the stakes are lower, 
as evidenced in Table 3 by a p-value of 0.068 for a comparison of high payoff, high social 
distance ( R S$ ) data with low payoff, high social distance ( R S$ ) data.  Also, the frequency with 
which women are generous is inversely related to the social distance. This conclusion is 
supported by a p-value of 0.016 for a comparison of high payoff, low social distance ( RS
$ ) data 
with high payoff, high social distance ( R S$ ) data.  With respect to reciprocity, the evidence is 
mixed.  In the environment with low social distance and high payoffs, women do reciprocate: the 
p-value is 0.03 for a comparison of data from the trust game $SR  with data from the dictator game 
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$
SD .  However, when the levels of social distance and payoffs are reversed, women no longer 
reciprocate: the p-value is 0.87 for a comparison of data from $
SR  and with data from $
SD .12   
 Additional econometric analysis also supports the conclusion that women are more 
responsive to the costs of generosity while the behavior of men can be described as cost-
inelastic. A probit model, given by equation (1), is estimated treating the choice between 
generous and selfish options as a function of the level of the monetary payoffs, the opportunity to 
reciprocate, and the social distance in the experimental protocol. The estimating equation is 
(1) Probability of Generous Behavior =  
Φ(α + β1HP + β2NR + β3HSD + β4F + β5HPF + β6NRF + β7HSDF)  
where Φ denotes the cumulative density for the standard normal distribution.        
In this specification HP and HSD are dummy variables that take on the value 1 for High 
Payoff and High Social Distance treatments, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  NR is a dummy 
variable equal to one for the non-reciprocal environment of the dictator game.  F is a dummy 
variable for gender that equals 1 for a female decision-maker and 0 for a male decision-maker.  
The terms HPF, NRF, and HSDF are interaction dummies that are the product of the female 
dummy variable F with the treatment dummy variables HP, NR, and HSD respectively.  Table 4 
reports the results of estimating equation (1) with the available data.   
The estimation results imply that men do not alter their behavior in response to any of the 
experimental treatments while women clearly do.  Formally, the hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 
is not rejected at any standard confidence level based on a likelihood ratio test (LR test statistic = 
2.37).  Taking this finding into account, equation (2) is estimated.13   
(2) Probability of Generous Behavior = Φ(α + β4F + β5HPF + β6NRF + β7HSDF) 
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The results of this estimation, also reported in Table 4, indicate that the behavior of 
female subjects conforms to the predictions of an economic model where the cost of generosity 
influences behavior. When the monetary cost associated with generosity increases, women 
become less generous: β5 < 0. When the social cost of not reciprocating a kind action is 
eliminated, the rate of generous responses is reduced: β6 < 0.  When the level of social distance 
in the protocol is increased, the social cost of not being generous decreases and generous 
responses are observed less frequently: β7 < 0.   
Because male subjects do not react to the cost of generosity, their behavior is consistent 
with a model of behavior based solely on money payoffs, while women do tend to incorporate 
the cost of generosity into their decisions.  Based upon these findings, it is not appropriate to talk 
about which gender is more generous without also specifying the cost of generosity. The positive 
and significant value of β4 should not be interpreted as indicating that women are generally more 
generous than men.  Instead, the value of β4 should be interpreted as stating that when generosity 
is less costly (HP = NR = HSD = 0) women tend to choose the generous response more 
frequently than men.   
IV. FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
 In the high social distance treatment discussed above, subjects were from the same 
school, perhaps coming from the same classes.  Those subjects entered the lab at the same time 
and waited together for the experiment to begin.  Thus the subjects might have perceived some 
social connection with their counterparts, possibly lessening the degree of social distance.  To 
address this concern, additional subjects played the low stakes versions of the trust game and the 
dictator game following the high social distance protocol detailed previously, but where 
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counterparts were located at different universities (the University of Arkansas and Indiana 
University) and had no contact with each other.14   
 The protocol for the geographically separated sessions was modified as follows. Subjects 
were informed by an experimenter that their counterparts were located in a lab at the other 
university; they were also informed of this feature in the directions and in the informed consent 
documentation.15  The experiment was hand run; subjects were asked to complete a response 
form and return it in a sealed envelope. To implement the double blind payoff procedure, a 
monitor was randomly selected from among the subjects at each location.  The role of the 
monitor is similar to that in Cox (2002; 2004).  The monitor walked through the lab with a box 
full of identical large manila envelopes containing response forms and mailbox keys; subjects 
were allowed to take any one manila envelope from the box. After completing their response 
forms, subjects returned the forms to the manila envelopes and deposited the envelopes in the 
box at the front of the lab.  After all envelopes had been returned, the monitor brought the box to 
another room for processing by the experimenters. The monitor also verified the e-mail 
communications between the two researchers reporting decisions in the two geographically 
separated laboratories. The subjects had been informed at the beginning of the experiment that 
they were free to ask the monitor any questions at any time about the procedures followed by the 
experimenter.   
 The results of these sessions are reported in Table 5.  While nominally there is less 
generosity in the treatment with geographically-separated subjects, the difference is not 
significant for men or women in either game.  Further, the increased physical distance does not 
change the previous conclusion that neither men nor women reciprocate with a high social 
distance protocol (p-values of 0.581 and 0.858 respectively).  The geographical separation also 
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does not change the relative generosity of men and women as reported in Table 2.  These results 
suggest that standard double blind payoff procedures are sufficient to create substantial social 
distance between subjects.   
V. DISCUSSION 
 This study finds that women are more responsive to the total economic and social costs of 
generous behavior than are men.  Similar conclusions about the greater responsiveness of women 
to the decision context have been drawn by Cadsby and Maynes (1998) in the context of public 
goods games and Eckel and Grossman (1996) in the context of punishment games.  Such 
responsiveness by women to the total economic and social costs of generosity may explain why 
previous studies have drawn different conclusions about whether men or women are more 
generous.  For example, if the subset of data reported in this study in which low social distance 
and high payoff levels is considered, women would be found to reciprocate while men would be 
found not to reciprocate.  If, instead, attention were restricted to the subset of data drawn from 
the low payoff and high social distance environment, then neither sex would be found to 
reciprocate.  To ascertain if this finding does reconcile the seemingly inconsistent conclusions in 
previous studies, we examine the relationship between the experimental designs and results of 
those studies most similar to our own.   
 Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that women are more generous than men in a dictator 
game with high social distance and low payoffs, which is the same nominal pattern that we 
observed in our DS$  treatment (see Table 2).  However, using the results from our probit 
estimation, the null hypothesis that all of the “direct” and “crossed” female dummy variables are 
equal to zero (β4 + β6 + β7 = 0) cannot be rejected at standard significance levels in a two-tailed 
likelihood ratio test.  The dictator games of Bolton and Katoc (1995) involved $10 and employed 
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single blind payoff procedures.  Hence, using our labeling of treatments, their design would be 
considered to be a (non-reciprocal) dictator game with low payoffs and low social distance 
( D S$ ).  While we do not address this treatment directly, we would expect to see a higher rate of 
female generosity in their treatment than in either our high payoff, low social distance ( DS
$ ) or 
low payoff, high social distance ( DS$ ) treatment because lower stakes reduce the cost of 
generosity and lower social distance increases the social cost of ungenerous choices. It would not 
be surprising to observe the absence of a gender effect in D S$ , as reported by Eckel and 
Grossman, because there is none in our $
SD  or $SD  treatments. However the likelihood ratio test 
statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the sum of the dummy variables for “female” and 
“female & non-reciprocal game” equals 0 (β4 + β6 = 0) is 3.33 which, has a p-value of 0.068.  
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2003) studied the investment game16 using low payoffs and a 
single blind payoff (low social distance) protocol, an SR$  treatment.  Based on our results, each 
of these features should increase the relative generosity of female subjects.  Given that we found 
women to be more generous than men in the high payoff, low social distance ( RS
$ ) treatment (see 
Table 2), our results can explain their finding that women are more generous than men.  This is 
also supported by the fact that the female dummy variable (β4) is significantly greater than 0 (see 
Table 4).     
Our results seem to be at odds with data reported by Cox (2002), but a close look proves 
interesting. Using data from an experimental design involving the investment and dictator games, 
Cox (2002) reports that men reciprocate and women do not in a high social distance 
environment. In the investment game, the first mover could send any amount from his/her $10 
endowment, in whole dollar units, (weakly) between $0 and $10. Any amount sent was 
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multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. The second mover also was given a $10 endowment and 
could return any of the tripled amount received to the first mover. Hence, only if the first mover 
sent all $10 in the investment game did the second mover have $40 to divide between the paired 
subjects. Also, only in case the first mover chose to send his/her entire $10 endowment to the 
paired second mover was there the possibility that the first mover could end up with zero payoff 
as a result of the second mover’s decision.  In contrast, in the trust game with high payoffs 
shown in Figure 1, the second mover either has to choose “exit” (which corresponds to sending 
$0 in the investment game) or choose “engage,” which exposes him/her to the risk of ending up 
with $0 while the second mover gets $40 (which corresponds to sending all $10 in the 
investment game). Interestingly, if one considers only the observations in Cox (2002) in which 
the first mover sent all $10 to the second mover, then a pattern of behavior similar to our results 
for the high payoff, high social distance ( R S$ ) treatment emerges.17  Based on this subset of data, 
a Wilcoxon rank test rejects the hypotheses that either gender reciprocates at the 5% significance 
level.  We also find that neither gender reciprocated in a high social distance context (see Table 
3).  This may suggest that complete trust elicits different responses due to emotions or social 
norms than does partial trust.  However, a test of that is beyond the scope of this paper.        
We cannot explain why Croson and Buchan (1999) find that women are more generous 
than men in an investment game experiment that can be characterized as high payoff, high social 
distance (corresponding to our R S$  treatment).  It is possible that some aspect of their 
experimental protocol or perhaps the density of the message space affects males and females 
differently. Their study did not vary the level of payoffs, the opportunity to reciprocate, nor the 
level of social distance, so we cannot determine if the relative patterns of behavior in our 
experiment would hold in their environment.   
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The experiments reported in this paper examine some potential reasons for generous 
behavior such as shame (which may vary with the social distance in the protocol) and guilt 
(which may differ between trust and dictator games).  However, this study does not address other 
motivations for generous behavior such as envy and compassion which could affect males and 
females differently. Similarly, the behavior may differ in repeated interactions where social 
norms and strategic concerns can differ. Thus additional research is needed to fully understand 
the conditions in which there are significant gender differences in generous behavior.  
For example, in public goods experiments the results might not show the same absolute 
or relative levels of generosity by gender.  However, one would expect the same pattern of 
comparative statics across treatments within a gender.  While few gender studies have examined 
social distance, payoff levels, or reciprocity, there is at least one that did.  Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) compare contributions to a public good across two levels of social distance.  In 
one treatment, the groups are anonymously matched (corresponding to our low social distance 
treatment) while in a second treatment social distance is decreased as the group members interact 
prior to the decision task.  This interaction is a deliberate attempt by the researchers to form a 
community relation among the decision-makers.  In the first period, male behavior did not vary 
across treatments but females were more generous in the lower social distance community 
treatment, which is consistent with our findings.18     
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) consider a variant of the dictator game in which a 
subject allocated tokens which could be redeemed for cash at a role-specific rate.  By varying 
these exchange rates and the number of tokens, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) observed 
decisions across eight budget constraints. They concluded that men are more sensitive to 
variations in the price of altruism, which is implemented by varying the conversion rates 
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between a dictator’s tokens and a recipient’s tokens.  Our experimental design does not address 
the type of price elasticity of altruism question that is addressed in the Andreoni and Vesterlund 
experiment because the own-payoff cost of transferring $X (= $7.50 or $15) to the other subject 
is always $X in all of our treatments. In contrast, a different feature of the Andreoni and 
Vesterland experimental design is comparable to our design. This is the feature in which they 
vary the payoff level while holding constant the social distance and the (absence of) reciprocal 
motivation. Specifically, their budget #5 is similar to our low payoff, high social distance 
dictator game ( DS$ ) treatment and corresponds to the standard dictator game of dividing $10.  In 
this case they find no gender difference.  Their budget #4 corresponds to a standard dictator 
game involving only $6.  In this case, they report that women are more generous than men.  The 
gender difference between the budget #4 and #5 treatment effect is in the direction that is 
consistent with our results: their female subjects were more responsive than their male subjects 
to a change in payoff levels.   
As noted above, the Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) data indicate that men’s responses 
in distribution experiments are more price elastic and women’s responses are more income 
elastic. Our data also indicate that women’s responses are more income elastic: women are more 
responsive to variations in the total cost of the generous response than are men. These results 
provide further support for the general conclusion that the relative responsiveness of males and 
females varies across treatments. That is, women are more responsive to some changes in the 
environment while men are more responsive to others.        
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed to explore gender 
differences in generosity.  The results indicate that women tend to be more generous than men 
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when: (1) the social distance is low, (2) the total monetary cost of generosity is low, and/or (3) 
there is an absence of reciprocal motivation.  Thus, depending on the decision context, women 
may appear to be more or less generous than men because men are relatively less responsive to 
changes in the total economic and social costs of generous behavior. This finding helps to 
explain why previous studies have drawn seemingly contradictory conclusions.   
Of course, the motivations explored in this paper represent only a partial list of factors 
that could influence generosity. As this paper helps demonstrate, one should be cautious about 
drawing general conclusions about gender differences that are independent of decision context.  
For example, it is not the case that women are more generous in dictator games, irrespective of 
other aspects of the decision task.  In this same vein, results that hold in controlled environments 
such as experimental laboratories may not hold in some non-laboratory environments.  However, 
Laury and Taylor (2004) do report that laboratory behavior in a public good experiment predicts 
who will contribute to a naturally-occurring public good.     
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1 A transcript of the January 2005 speech is available at 
http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html. 
2 In both studies males are reported to be somewhat overconfident.     
3 The interview aired on December 15, 2004 as part of All Things Considered.  The audio 
segment is available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4229951.  A more 
detailed discussion can be found in Fischer (1999).   
4 For example, in an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good, Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) find that men are more generous while Nowell and Tinker (1994) conclude the 
opposite.  Cadsby and Maynes (1998) draw a third conclusion from a series of public good 
experiments: men and women are equally generous.     
5 See McCabe and Smith (2000) and Cox and Deck (2005) for studies that explore issues of 
reciprocity and cooperation using the trust game.  The trust game itself is a binary version of the 
investment game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) which has also been widely used to 
explore trust and reciprocity. 
6 Potentially charged terms such as game, play, and generosity were not used with the subjects.  
For example, the game was referred to as a decision tree and players were referred to as decision-
makers.  Also, decisions were made by mouse clicks on unnamed branches.  
7 The directions and the quiz are available form the authors and online at 
http://comp.uark.edu/~cdeck/expinfo.htm. 
8 “Mover 2” has no decision to make in a dictator “game.” 
9 Since only one person makes a decision in the dictator game, the payoff order is the reverse of 
the order in the trust game where the same decision is faced by the second mover.     
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10 Conducting experiments under all eight possible treatment combinations (a complete 2x2x2 
design) is not necessary to identify primary treatment effects.  In fact only four treatments are 
necessary, and the five treatments in Cox and Deck (2005) that were used to explore reciprocity 
and identify why behavior in R S$  and RS
$ differed are sufficient to identify treatment effects in the 
present paper.  Data for the other three treatments could, however, enrich the story as follows.  
For females: (1) would testing data for $SR  vs. $SD  look like 
$SR  vs. $
SD  or $SR  vs. $SD ; (2) 
would testing data for $SR  vs. $SR  add further support to the consistent conclusions from testing 
$SR vs. $
SR  and $SR  vs. $SR ; and (3) would testing data for 
$SD vs. $SD  show a significant 
effect?  For males, would testing data for $SR , $SD , and 
$SD vs. data for the five treatments now 
reported yield any significant results?   
11 Some of these data, aggregated across gender, were previously reported in Cox and Deck 
(2005).  Approximately half of the first movers in the trust game treatments chose to end the 
game by opting for an equal split of a smaller amount of money rather than giving the second 
movers the opportunity to act generously.  Hence, the number of observations on generous 
behavior in the trust game treatments is approximately half the number of subject pairs in the 
treatment. The proportions of women who chose to engage the second mover in each treatment 
were as follows: $SR (7/22); $SR (14/22); $
SR (9/20). The proportions of men who chose to engage 
the second mover in each treatment were as follows: $SR (13/26); $SR (7/20); $
SR (17/31).  
12 A similar pattern is found in the first mover data mentioned in footnote 11.  There is no 
treatment effect on male first movers in the trust game.  Female first movers are more likely to 
engage the second mover in the low social distance treatment than in the high social distance 
 
 
 26
 
treatment (p-value = 0.0346).  While females were nominally more likely to engage the second 
mover in the low payoff environment, this difference was not significant (p-value = 0.3796).  
13 In the remainder of the paper, references to the probit model and its parameters are to 
specification (2) in which β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 is imposed. 
14  These two treatments were selected because they are directly comparable to two of the 
treatments presented in Table 1. 
15 No subject questioned the existence of the subjects at the other location. 
16 The investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) is an extension of the trust game 
with a denser message space. In the investment game, a first and second mover are each 
endowed with $10.  The first mover can keep all of her $10 or send any whole dollar amount to 
the paired second mover.  Any amount sent is tripled by the experimenter.  Finally, the second 
mover can keep all of any tripled amount received or return any whole dollar part of it to the 
paired first mover.  
17 These results are based on a relatively small sample size because only 13 observations in each 
of the games in Cox (2002) involved decisions where keeping $40 was feasible.   
18 Subjects in Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) were in same sex groups and the decision task 
was repeated over several rounds.   
Captions and Notes for Figures 
FIGURE 1  
Extensive Form Games Involving Cooperation 
 
Notes:   
 denotes the first mover’s decision node and  
 denotes the second mover’s decision node. 
 
 
 
 
Tables 
  TABLE 1   
Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Decision Type 
Monetary 
Payoff 
Social 
Distance 
Number of 
Subject Pairs 
SR$  Reciprocity Low High 51 
SD$  Dictator Low High 37 
$
SR  Reciprocity High Low 42 
$
SD  Dictator High Low 24 
SR$  Reciprocity High High 48 
Notes:  As detailed in Cox and Deck (2005), the existence of 
reciprocity can be explored by comparing SR$ with 
SD$  or 
$
SR  with 
$
SD . 
The effects of changing the monetary cost and social distance are 
directly measured by comparing SR$  with SR$  and 
$
SR , respectively.     
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2   
Across - Gender Comparisons of Generous Behavior 
Treatment Frequency of Female Generosity 
Frequency of 
Male Generosity 
Nominally More 
Generous Gender 
R S$  5/10 4/16 Female 
DS$  7/15 8/22 Female 
RS
$  6/9 6/12 Female 
DS
$  3/14 5/10 Male 
R S$  1/8 5/12 Male 
Notes:  The numerator is the number of people who acted generously and the 
denominator is the total number of people who had the opportunity to behave 
generously.   
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3   
Within Gender Treatment Effects  
               Males 
Females R
S
$  D
S
$  RS
$  DS
$  R S$  
R S$  - 0.457 0.172 0.192 0.350 
DS$  0.870 - 0.440 0.467 0.761 
RS
$  0.462 0.341 - 0.999 0.682 
DS
$  0.143 0.153 0.030** - 0.696 
R S$  0.068* 0.074* 0.016** 0.524 - 
Notes:  The table entries are p-values associated with testing the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of subjects acting generously is identical in the two treatments being 
compared versus the two-sided alternative.  Given the binary nature of the data, the 
analysis uses a z-statistic.  * indicates significance at the 10% level and ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level.  Comparisons above the main diagonal are of male subjects 
while comparisons of female subjects are presented below the diagonal.  The two 
treatments being compared are given by the row and column headings.   
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4   
Probit Estimation      
Parameter Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 Estimate Standard Error p-value Estimate 
Standard 
Error p-value
Intercept (α) -0.4752 0.6136 0.4387 -0.2822* 0.1499 0.0597 
Ηigh Payoff (β1) 0.3859 0.4683 0.2049 - - - 
Νon-reciprocal (β2) 0.1965 0.3376 0.2803 - - - 
High Distance (β3) -0.1211 0.4775 0.3999 - - - 
Female (β4) 2.0102** 1.0165 0.0480 1.8172** 0.8240 0.0274 
High Payoff & 
Female (β5) 
-1.8463** 0.8101 0.0113 -1.4604** 0.6611 0.0136 
Non-reciprocal & 
Female (β6) 
-0.7979* 0.5056 0.0573 -0.6014* 0.3763 0.0550 
High Distance & 
Female (β7) 
-1.1038* 0.8199 0.0891 -1.2250** 0.6665 0.0330 
Notes:  The p-values reported for α and β4 are for a null hypothesis that the coefficient is 
equal to zero versus the two sided alternative.  For the remaining parameters the 
alternative hypothesis is that the value of the parameter is less than zero as the dummy has 
a value of one when the economic or social costs of ungenerous behavior are lower.  * 
indicates significance at the 10% level and ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5   
Effect of Geographical Separation on Frequency of Generosity 
Female Male 
Treatment 
Same 
Location  
Different 
Locations p-value 
Same 
Location 
Different 
Locations p-value 
R S$  5/10 3/9 0.463 4/16 2/12 0.595 
DS$  7/15 6/20  0.313 8/22 5/20 0.426 
Notes:  The p-values associated with testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of 
subjects of a particular gender acting generously is identical in the two geographical 
conditions being compared versus the two-sided alternative.  Given the binary nature of the 
data, the analysis uses a z-statistic.  As in table 2, bold entries denote a nominally grater 
rate of generosity by that gender in the given treatment.     
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